1. What “popped-up” from reading the paper
   • Diamond et al. (2019) suggest that one motivation for rent control is that it is an indirect way to insure against house prices. What do you think of that motivation?
   • What do you think about the conclusion of the paper: the law served as a transfer from future renters in the city to renters in 1994, creating economic wellbeing inequality between incumbent and future renters of San Francisco
2. Cardinal Estimates
   • Size of Impact
   • Impact on Housing Supply
   • Ownership Conversions
3. What is missing from the Econ 101 figure of rent control that is addressed by Diamond et al. (2019)
   • Across Race
   • Changes in Neighborhood Quality
   • High Low Appreciation Affects
   • Gentrification
4. What is left unaddressed by the paper?

Technical Questions about the Paper

• A suitable alternative identification strategy would be to implement a regression discontinuity design. Which raises the question, why do the authors define their treatment group as units built between $1900$ and $1980$?

  $$ \underbrace{\lim {t \to 1980-}\mathbb{E}[Y{i} \vert T_i=t]}{\text{Treated}} - \underbrace{\lim {t \to 1980-}\mathbb{E}[Y{i} \vert T_i=t]}{\text{Control}} $$